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Abstract: 
This paper tests for the extent of moral hazard problem within a Crop Damage 
Compensation (CDC) program that is similar to traditional multi peril crop insurances 
but is publicly funded and openly accessible for all farmers in Finland. We further 
estimate the potential of using the observed farmer and farm characteristics in ranking 
and classifying farms according to their incidence towards losses when they are 
protected.  
 
The data are the claimed and granted indemnity payments for each farm over the fifteen 
year period of 1995-2009. These data are complemented by data on total farm population 
in 2005.  
 
The data suggest that most of the farmers (60%) have not made any claims in the CDC 
program over the 15 year period. Those farms that claimed compensation did so typically 
either once or twice within the 15 year period. Nevertheless, a substantial number of 
farmers have claimed and also granted indemnity payments more regularly than can be 
justified by the exogenous (aggregate level) yield distributions. Based on the logit 
models, farmers and farms with certain observed characteristics are more inclined to the 
losses than the others. In general presence of animals declines the probability of crop 
damage. However, the existence of different animals on the farm classifies the farms by 
their inclination to collect crop damage compensations. In addition, the fixed 
municipality effects are significant indicating that the persons in charge for appraising 
the losses implement different standards.    
 
 
Introduction 
 
In traditional yield insurances, the indemnity payments are based on the difference 
between the farm specific yields and reference yields that are determined e.g. by the 
farm’s yield history or the average yields in the county. The existing literature indicates 
that within these insurance contracts, the losses as well as the resulting indemnity 
payments are partially endogenous for a farmer and, therefore, the efficiency of the 
contracts is significantly decreased by asymmetric information problems (Just et al. 
1999). The reason is that insured agents can use private information to change their 
behaviour to the cost of the insurer. An example is to increase the likelihood to 
experience yield losses by decreasing the use of risk decreasing inputs (Chambers 1989; 
Smith and Goodwin 2006). This, so called moral hazard problem, can make the yield 
risks non-insurable and break down the whole market for these risks. 
 
Typical solution to get yield risks insurable through traditional yield insurances has been 
to allocate substantial public supports to the insurance programs. EU countries, for 
example, can pay up to 65% premium supports to multi peril crop insurances under the 
CAP. Different national systems also exist and, for example, the Finnish approach has 
been to maintain a Crop Damage Compensation (CDC) program that is publicly funded 
and provides similar protection as a multi peril crop insurance. In this system, all farmers 
cultivating the crops eligible in the program are nevertheless automatically covered by 
the program. Therefore, the program suffers from moral hazard, but not from adverse 
selection1. The CDC program provides, therefore, a unique possibility to identify and test 
for the implications of moral hazard so that the results isolate from other economic 
problems and behavioural issues driven by asymmetric information. The moral hazard 
problem raises several important questions and within the subsidized insurance schemes 
one question is the allocation of public supports amongst farmers with different 
performance and how consistent these supports are with regards to other policy goals, 
such as increasing the resilience and productivity of the agricultural sector.  
 
This paper analyses the implications of moral hazard using unique data on the Finnish 
CDC program. Our goal is further to estimate observable proxies and farm characteristics 
that can be used to classify farms by their true risk exposition when they are insured. A 
particular strength our analysis is that we have data on farm specific indemnity payments 
each year over a fifteen year period of 1995-2009. With regards to other farm 
characteristics, our data are for the total population and, thus, they cover farms that have 
not made any claims in the CDC program. Further, our data allow us to test for the 
potential bias (fixed effects) caused by the inspectors who appraise the farm specific 
losses after a farmer has filed a claim. So, we can test on how significant problems may 
rise by subjective appraisal of the damages. This information is invaluable e.g. in 
comparing the pros and cons between the traditional insurance mechanisms and more 
exogenous index based mechanisms.     
 
Accurate estimates of farm-level crop yield density functions are an important starting 
point for studying crop insurance programs (Goodwin and Ker 1998; Ker and Coble 
2004; Sherrick et al. 2004). They are not only important for researchers and government 
officials but also more significantly so for producers operating under risk and uncertainty. 
However, farm level crop yield density functions are difficult to estimate due to lack of 
sufficient farm yield data. Sometimes the actual yields are unknown even for farmers, and 
farmers are asked about the frequency of good and bad yields (Smith and Baquet 1996).  
 
The observed farm level yield data is typically a product of process biased by self 
selection, due to the fact that the worst performing farms are not willing to take part on 
voluntary yield databases where farmers compare their farming methods and yields. 
These databases are commonly used in farm adviser services also in Finland 
(www.proagria.fi/tuotteet/atk/lohkot/). Also the usability of book keeping farm databases 
is questionable from the reason mentioned above, even if book keeping data would be 
interesting because of long histories of individual farms being involved in the records 
(www.mtt.fi/economydoctor). From other data sources have been found useless in 
predicting farm level crop yield density function because historical farm level data are 
typically short in time horizon.  
 
Farm level crop yield density functions are derived from aggregated national yield 
statistics with mixed results.  Xu 2004 has listed three main obstacles on this task. First, 
yield volatility is lowered at the country, district, and state or nation level due to 
averaging effect. This effect is confirmed in numerous studies (Kimura et al. 2010). The 
                                                 
1 Unless farming and exit decision are not affected by the CDC program. 
outcome is logical because good yields in some areas overdo the crop damages in some 
other areas within the aggregation area. If this issue is not considered it leads to 
significant underestimation of farm level crop damage risks. Second, time series of crop 
yields are found to be non stationary. Sophisticated time series methods like time varying 
distributions are used to detrend the aggregated yield statistic before converting to farm 
level statistics (Zhu et al. 2008). Some errors have found, because of errors in filtering 
and unreliable crop yield produced (Maradiaga 2010).  Third, crop yield may not be 
normally distributed. However, this claim has given a lot of rejecting opinions as well as 
support (Just and Weninger 1999). From the crop insurance viewpoint, the density of the 
lowest yields is the most interesting part of yield density function. Ker and Coble (2004) 
have shown that Beta yield distribution based premium rate could be more than two times 
greater than premium rates based on normal yield density distribution estimated from the 
same yield data.  
 
Farm characteristics could be used for explaining the fixed farm effect and could be used 
in risk classification. Farm characteristics helps to find farm specific yield means, but the 
farm specific crop yield density function with in these characterised farm croups remains 
uncertain. This leads to the situation where crop yield insurances could be differently 
prices between the farm groups, but the fair prices with in these groups’ remains 
uncertain. However the result is useful compared to situation where we do not have any 
risk classification for farms.  
 
 
The CDC program 
 
The main characteristics of the Finnish Crop Damage Compensation (CDC) program are 
similar to those in the traditional multi peril crop insurance. A Farmer is entitled to a crop 
damage compensation (an indemnity payment) if the whole farm yield is damaged to the 
extent that it is at least 30% below the corresponding reference yield. The reference yield 
is the regional yield average which has stayed stable over the years. The program 
compensates only quantity losses that exceed the 30% threshold and average producer 
prices are used to determine the monetary amount of compensation. With regards to the 
quantity losses the coverage of the indemnity payments is 100%, because all losses 
exceeding the 30% threshold are all compensated. Nevertheless, with regards to quality 
losses, the coverage is zero, as the losses due to decreased quality are not compensated at 
all. As the result, the true protection level (usually referred as coverage) is lower for high 
performance (yield & quality) farmers than for low performance farmers (figure 1). 
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Figure 1. The impact of the farm average yield (x-axis) and yield variation (dotted 
upward sloping path) on the probability for yield losses (down sloping curve) of at least 
30% from the reference yield (horizontal line).   
 
Figure 1 is an example of CDC and calculation are based on normal distribution 
prediction in crop yield distribution. We accept the prevailing consensus that crop-yield 
distributions are non-normal (Sherrick et al 2004).  
 
The CDC is more inflexible than many crop insurance products. The terms of the 
program, such as the coverage, are fixed so that a farmer cannot purchase a better 
protection through upgrading the scale and the coverage of the program even if he would 
be willing to pay full cost of the upgrading. Thus, the optional terms of upgrading the 
program cannot be used to rank and classify farmers according to their risk preferences.  
 
Formally the indemnity payment ( ) for farm (i) is   in
 
max ( ,0)i c in y y p      
 
where  
0.7c cy strike      
c = the critical yield (crains, hey, silage etc.), based on the average yields 
in the county, 
iy  = realization of the stochastic yield of farm i 
p  = average output prices at the farm gate  
 
 
Statistical methods for farm ranking 
 
Logit models were used to analyze which farm characteristics best explain observed yield 
losses. In this cased dependent variable is binominal. Variable got value 1 if yield loss 
has occurred at least ones with in 15 years and 0 if there is zero record of yield losses 
referred by CDC program. The logit mode used is 
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where P(loss) is the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution, β is the 
parameter vector and x includes the independent variables.  
 
We start the analysis by regress the number of yield losses against farm characteristics. 
Thereafter the standard logit model is implemented. Finally the logit model is extended 
by using ordered logit model to explain the number of yield losses in 15 years. 
 
 
Data 
 
We have two data sets. The first data are the claimed and granted crop damage 
compensations for each farm over the fifteen year period of 1995-2010. This dataset is 
large, including farm and field plot specific data among the granted indemnity payments. 
However, the data include only the farms that have claimed compensation under the 
CDC-program for at least once in 1995-2010.  
 
The second data are for all farms, also including those farms that have never made any 
claims in the CDC-program. These data are nevertheless only a cross section for year 
2005. The two datasets are fully matched by the farm identification codes. The cross 
section data include farm coordinates (the location), Municipal identification, arable land 
area, leased area, production technology (organic / conventional), farmer age and the 
number of different animals on the farm.  So, most of these variables are fixed across 
time and can be matches quite well with the annual data on indemnity payments.   
 
The total number of farms in the country was 95,562 in 1995 and it had decreased to 
63,716 farms in 2010. All together 40,276 farms claimed crop compensation within the 
fifteen year sampling period at least once.  In average one out from four claims were 
turned down and the remaining 29,073 farms received the compensation at least once. 
Thus, over the fifteen year period, the compensation was granted at least once for less 
than half of all farms in the country. About 25,000 farmers received the compensation 
exactly either once (19,506) or twice (6,300) (table 1). 
 
 
 
Table 1. Cross section of Finnish farms in 2005 by the number of received CDC 
compensations in 1995-2009. 
 
Number of 
received CDC 
compensations 
Frequency 
of  
farms 
0 45784
1 19506
2 6300
3 2057
4 700
5 292
6 109
7 51
8 32
9 14
10 5
11 5
12 1
13 1
14 0
15 0
 
 
The choice of farm specific attributes to be associated with the occurred yield loss is 
driven by attempt for transparency and visibility as farm specific yield density functions 
are not visible. The purpose of the study is to rank and classify farms according to their 
incidence towards losses when they are protected by CDC. Unobservable and latent 
variables are in this sense useless, unless they associate latent groups to be identified with 
observable variables (e.g., Maybery et al. 2005; Ross-Davis and Broussard 2007).  
 
Pervious studies have confirmed that capital, either human or monetary, plays an 
important role on farmers ability to smooth income waives or protect against 
unfavourable weather conditions through on farm investments. Smith and Baquet (1996) 
showed that purchasing and coverage level decisions are significantly connected to the 
farmer’s education level. We use age as a proxy for farmer’s experience. In Finnish data 
this is plausible, because weather conditions have soil type specific impacts on yield. 
Every farmer has to learn these weather-soil relationships to avoid yield losses and obtain 
good yields. Farmer age might also have a positive correlation to yield losses if aged 
farmer loses his/her interest in farming and relay on safety nets of CAP and CDC 
programs. 
 
We do not have any figures of farm level income or capital assets. All farmers keep 
records of their income and costs for tax authorities but these records are not accessible 
for insurers. We observe only a farm size in terms of the arable land area and the number 
of animal on the farm. Arable land area is expected to be a proxy for farm capital. Even if 
we do not know the exact debt ratio we could expect that financial institutions and land 
owners have studied the collateral related financing the land rents or debts. It is assumed 
and proved that accumulated capital will have a negative effect on the demand for crop 
insurances due to farmers increased capability for self-insurance. On the other hand, 
Coble et al. 1996 found that increasing farm size increased the probability to take yield 
insurance. They concluded that spreading of fixed transaction cost of yield insurances to 
more insured acres would overdo the absolute risk aversion with increasing wealth. 
Phenomenon compared to above could also be found from CDC program. Small farms 
with small expected indemnity payment might neglect the claim procedure due to higher 
transaction cost compared to expected indemnity payment.      
 
Ownership of the farm has connection to average yield level due to land tenure insecurity. 
Lacking or delayed land improvements on leased plots might lover the average yield. 
Also the yield volatility might be increased. In Finnish conditions adverse weather events 
compounded to broken drainage systems might cause significant yield losses. Misha and 
Goodwin 2006 found that tenants are 13% more likely to purchase on revenue insurance 
compared to full-owners. In Finland we do not have pure tenant farmers, but we could 
control the share of rented area.  
 
For our knowledge, farm level yield risk rankings based on the number of animals are 
absent on yield insurance literature. Conventional multi peril crop insurances are tailored 
for cash crop farms but not for all type of farms like CDC. This gives an opportunity to 
test if general presence of animals decreased the probability of crop damage because 
intensive animal husbandries increase incentives to harvest a good roughage yields on the 
farm. Different animal types are equalised with weights2 and effects are thereafter tested.  
 
 
Results 
 
We first regress the farm characteristics on the frequency of indemnity payments granted 
for each farm over the whole sampling period. This linear OLS model does not exploit 
the panel structure yet, but it provides consistent estimates. Efficiency of these estimates 
is also decreased since the discrete characteristics and the boundaries of the dependent 
variable are not fully utilized in the estimation. These results can nevertheless be used as 
the first step and to see how robust our results are with respect to different specifications 
and how much the Logit models improve the efficiency of the parameter estimates.  
 
Despite the different approaches on dependent variable all models give robust results. 
The linear model suggests that most of the used explanatory variables are significant 
(Table 2). The second specification defines the dependent variable equal to one if the 
farmer has received the indemnity payment for at least once. Otherwise the variable 
equals zero. We estimate this specification as the logit model.  
 
The logit model suggests that the likelihood for claiming the indemnity payments for at 
least once is smaller in the north and east than in the south and west. Even if municipal 
                                                 
2 Weights are taken from Publication “Finnish Agriculture and Rural Industries” 
level fixed effect is controlled the data suggest a systemic correlation on yield damages 
and compass directions. The regional tendencies are also visible when the yield losses 
where plotted on map. 
 
The regional differences may be explained by the different crop mixes, since in the north 
and east the farms allocate more land on grass and less to milling grains and other high 
risk crops as compared to the south and west. The effect of land allocations is supported 
also by the number of different animals on the farm. The more the farm has ruminants, 
e.g. cows, and hence the more it is specialized on roughage production on the land, the 
smaller is the probability of having granted the indemnity payment at least once. An 
intensive hog production increases the likelihood for yield loss.  
 
The likelihood for yield loss increases significantly with the farm’s arable land area, but 
does not depend significantly on how large share of this land is leased. The parameter 
estimates do not, therefore, reveal significant land tenure insecurity problem implying 
more frequent crop damages. However, the result does not necessarily confirm that yield 
losses do not happen more frequently on leased plots than on the plots owned by the 
farmer. The reason is that those farmers who have expanded their operations are the best 
performance farmers and a major share on increased farm size is based on land leasing. 
This means that high productive farmers and low productive leased plots are mixed on 
this explanatory variable. Due to these reasons it is obvious that share of own field does 
not explain crop damages. 
 
Farm size is positively correlated to crop damages in Finland. The CDC scheme should 
be farm size neutral, but it might be that transaction costs related to the smallest 
indemnity payments cut the distribution of indemnity payments. This might reveal the 
true transaction costs related to the CDC scheme and further research on this mater is 
needed.    
 
In general the number and presence of livestock on farm decreases the possibility for crop 
damage. However different livestock lines have a different relationship with crop 
damages. Typically farms having silage or hey (cow, sheep, horse) does face less crop 
damages than those specialised on grains (grain as a reference and hog) on their arable 
farming. Markets for silage and hey might be thin or absent in sparsely populated rural 
areas in Finland. Therefore it is important for milk and beef farmers to have a certain self 
sufficiency. The effect of horses is negative but not significant. Self sufficiency of forage 
may be maintained on extensively cultivated horse farms at lower yields and indemnity 
payments through CDC scheme will do as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Parameter estimates of the linear OLS and ordered logit regressing the farm 
characteristics on the number of indemnity payments granted for the farm. On logit 
model the dependent variable is binary (at least one crop damage). 
 
Parameter estimates Linear 
regression 
Pr > 
|t| 
Logit Pr > 
ChiSq 
Ordered 
logit 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
intercept12     13.3543 *** 
intercept10     14.4535 *** 
intercept9     14.7415 *** 
intercept8     15.4354 *** 
intercept7     15.6591 *** 
intercept6     16.1306 *** 
intercept5     16.8265 *** 
intercept4     17.9243 *** 
intercept3     18.9486 *** 
intercept2     20.455 *** 
intercept1 5.80118 *** 21.4676 *** 22.1251 *** 
north -0.00038 *** -0.00125 *** -0.00135 *** 
east -0.00089 *** -0.00426 *** -0.00423 *** 
farm size 0.00432 *** 0.011 *** 0.011 *** 
share of own field area 0.000711  0.00912  0.0013  
cow -0.00369 *** -0.00742 *** -0.00858 *** 
hog 0.00117 *** 0.00452 *** 0.00293 *** 
horse -0.00042  -0.00495  -0.005  
poultry 1.89E-05  -0.00496 *** -0.00378 *** 
sheep -0.00818 *** -0.0177 * -0.0179 ** 
farmer age 0.00245 *** 0.00599 *** 0.00638 *** 
Crop damage rates 11 and 13 are missing, because data is reduced due to missing variables in farmer age. Hit 
rates 14 and 15 does not exist in the data. 
Pr <0.01***, <0.05** and <0.1* 
 
 
Farmer age is a critical independent variable, but it is also linked to the number of 
observations, since the data have a large number of missing farmer age observations. 
However the estimated results are robust and do not change with reduced data when 
variable age is used. Farmer age has a significant and positively correlation with crop 
damages in Finland. 
 
Fixed municipal effect is on the other hand crucial when results are presented. In general 
fixed municipal effect is significant, but due to large number of municipals (482) we do 
not present all the fixed effects. It is still notable that this phenomenon is important and 
indicates that the persons in charge for appraising the losses implement different 
standards. The logit model for the first yield loss in 15 years and ordered logit model 
explaining the number of yield losses gained results similar to each other (Table 2 ). 
However the efficiency of estimates is improved with ordered logit model. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Identification of farm characteristics related to yield losses is important for insurance 
providers. Farm specific yields and underlying yield density functions are latent and not 
known by anybody else than farm operator. The coal of this paper is to identify those 
visible farm characteristics that could be connected to yield losses in general. The 
identification of these characteristics would be beneficial to insurance providers, policy 
makers, and agencies in their efforts designing insurance programmes better suited to the 
risk-reduction needs of farmers. 
 
The data suggest that most of the farmers (60%) have not made any claims of yield loss 
in the program over the 15 year period. Those farms that claimed compensation did so 
typically either once or twice within the 15 year period. Nevertheless, a substantial 
number of farmers have claimed and also granted indemnity payments more regularly 
than can be justified by the exogenous (aggregate level) yield distributions.  
 
Based on used logit models farmers and farms with certain observed characteristics are 
more inclined to the losses than the others. In general presence of animals lowers the 
probability of crop damage. Intensive animal husbandries increase incentives to harvest a 
good roughage yields on the farm. However, the existence of different animals on the 
farm classifies the farms by their inclination to collect crop damage compensations. In 
addition, the fixed municipality effects are significant indicating that the persons in 
charge for appraising the losses implement different standards. 
 
Due to the fact that we just have a cross section data we could not identify the connection 
between farming exit decisions and yield losses. Also the efficiency of estimated 
parameters would be improved with panel data.     
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